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By examining securitization speech acts and the organizational behavior of the agencies 
tasked with controlling border security and immigration, this thesis will examine the 
consequences of security discourse on United States policies for the borderlands, the 
impact of escalating speech acts for the securitization of those key territories, and the 
limits placed upon political leaders and relevant organizations by institutional forces. 
Specifically, this thesis will examine the implementation and consequences of guest-
worker programs between the United States and Mexico during World War I and World 
War II. In addition, this thesis will examine how organizational behavior shaped the 
ability of United States government agencies to implement and enforce border security 
and labor policy. 
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The security relationship between the United States and Mexico in the 20th 
century is a study in contradictions. In areas adjacent to major border communities, law 
enforcement officials conduct patrols behind massive fences while floodlights illuminate 
the border at night in an effort to deter illegal immigration. Yet a few miles outside of 
these populated areas, the fences rapidly dwindle in size and complexity and law 
enforcement patrols become more infrequent. Once well outside of the population 
centers, the once-imposing fence system deteriorates into a single line of wooden posts, 
and then eventually into nothing at all. United States law enforcement officials and the 
“coyotes” that shuttle illegal immigrants over the border know where the fences end, but 
the voting public remains satisfied as long as the appearance of security is maintained.      
Similarly, while American labor and social leaders advocate against the use of illegal 
immigrant labor in industry and agriculture and social pundits decry the effects of a large 
population of illegal immigrants on social programs, some business leaders have 
aggressively lobbied against legal provisions that would significantly punish industry for 
employing illegal immigrants. To the casual observer, the United States-Mexico security 
relationship may appear to be comprised of a number of half measures. 
To understand the how and why of the current United States-Mexico security 
relationship, it is necessary to examine the evolution of both the policies and the 
organizations tasked with the implementation of those policies. This thesis will utilize 
securitization as a tool to analyze why the United States implemented certain policies, and 
organizational behavior to analyze how policies were executed, in order to examine the 
development of United States border and labor policy toward Mexico from 1917 to 1964. 
Securitization is a process by which an issue is taken beyond “the established rules of the 
game” and treated as a special issue that requires extreme methods.1   In a traditional 
military-political sense, security is about survival of the state, and the nature of security 
threats allows the state to take extraordinary measures that would otherwise not be 
                                                 
1 Barry Buzan, Jaap Wilde, and Ole Wæver, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), 23. 
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permissible.2 A securitization speech act occurs when a policy argument becomes 
sufficiently urgent that the target audience will accept violations of rules that “must 
otherwise be obeyed.”3 Although by 1917 the U.S.-Mexico relationship had evolved past 
the time where either nation represented an existential security threat, the formulation and 
execution of United States policy concerning security of the U.S.-Mexican border and the 
usage of Mexican labor continued to be influenced by security discourse and 
organizational behavior of the agencies tasked with executing policy. 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
By examining securitization speech acts and the organizational behavior of the 
agencies tasked with controlling border security and immigration, this thesis will examine 
the consequences of security discourse on United States policies for the borderlands, the 
impact of escalating speech acts for the securitization of those key territories, and the 
limits placed upon political leaders and relevant organizations by institutional forces. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
This thesis will utilize policy analysis to identify how securitization and 
organizational behavior that have impacted public policy concerning the U.S.-Mexico 
border relationship and the consumption of Mexican labor by the United States. Policy 
analysis attempts to answer the question as to “why one specific state of the world came 
about, rather than some other.”4 By applying the study of securitization and 
organizational behavior to analyze United States policy in regard to consumption of 
Mexican labor and border security, this thesis seeks to answer the “why” of the current 
U.S.-Mexico relationship and illustrate how securitization and organizational behavior 
have shaped and limited U.S. policy. The nature of securitization, which implies the 
necessity for an immediate response to an existential threat that may or may not be real, 
tends to the limit the responses available to government and other civic leaders who are 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 21. 
3 Ibid., 25. 
4 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision Making: Explaining the Cuban Missile 
Crisis (New York: Longman, 1999), 3. 
 3
also limited by organizational behavior.5  By identifying the constraints placed upon 
policy makers by the use of securitizing language, this thesis will seek to inform policy 
makers as to the potentially negative affects of addressing the U.S.-Mexican border and 
labor market as a security situation rather than a strictly economic and political challenge. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
How has United States public policy been shaped by securitizing speech acts and 
organizational behavior in regard to the consumption of Mexican labor and the 
implementation of border security policies from 1917 to 1964?  The problem can be 
broken down into two areas: the formulation of policy, and the creation of institutions 
that implement the policy. Beginning in 1917, United States policy makers faced a duel 
challenge: how to meet the demands of a wartime economy while simultaneously 
providing a secure border with Mexico.6  While American involvement in World War I 
(WWI) was relatively short lived, policies and procedures put in place to increase 
available manpower during wartime through the use of Mexican contract labor created a 
policy template that would be utilized in the next national emergency. World War II 
(WWII) created an existential threat to the United States that required extraordinary 
measures to be implemented in the interests of American national security. While 
emergency labor accommodations put into place during WWII may have been justified 
under national security conditions, the continuation of these labor policies into the 1964 
and their long-term consequences require examination.   
Institutions must implement policy. However, a particular institution may be 
limited in its ability to implement policy by a number of factors. Some internal factors 
that may affect an institution’s ability to implement policy include available manpower, 
funding, organizational culture, and mission. External factors, such as public perception, 
political environment, and opposition, can also limit an organizations ability to 
implement policy. As United States border security and labor policy have continued to 
                                                 
5 Buzan et al., Security, 33. 
6 Ronald Mize and Alicia Swords, Consuming Mexican Labor: From the Bracero Program to NAFTA 
(University of Toronto Press, 2011), XXII. 
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evolve since 1917, the institutions tasked with implementing those policies have 
developed as well. Specifically, the United States Border Patrol and Immigration and 
Naturalization Service have been tasked with implementing United States border security 
and labor policies. However, the institutional organization, available manpower, and 
funding for these institutions may have affected their ability to implement government 
policy.   
The hypothesis of this thesis is that securitization speech acts in regard to the 
security of the Mexican border and the consumption of Mexican labor has influenced the 
creation of United States public policy. In addition, organizational behavior has tended to 
shape how United States policy has been implemented. By examining major events, 
political speech acts, and active institutions required to deal with these issues from 1917 
to 1964, this thesis expects utilize the study of securitization and organizational behavior 
to analyze how and why United States border security and labor policy with regard to 
Mexico has been created and implemented. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Introduction 
While the norms that govern the U.S.-Mexico border and labor relationship 
continue to develop, they have been significantly influenced by the securitization of 
several aspects of the U.S.-Mexico relationship. Recent scholarship, such as that by Peter 
Andreas, Thomas Biersteker, and Timothy Dunn, have focused on United States border 
security policies from the 1970s through early 2003 and have emphasized the politically 
successful yet failed policies of border enforcement. By analyzing the beginning of the 
modern United States-Mexico security relationship, from 1917 to 1964, this thesis seeks 
to add to the body of knowledge that describes how and why United States border 
security and labor policy has been crafted and implemented. First, to better understand 
how the relationship between the United States and Mexico continues to evolve over 
time, this section will review how realist and liberal theories of international relations 
help to explain the development of relations between nations. Second, this section will 
discuss how the framework of analysis proposed by Barry Buzan in Security: A New 
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Framework for Analysis applies to the analysis of the United States-Mexico relationship. 
Finally, this section will discuss recent scholarship by Peter Andreas that illustrates how 
the implementation of policy can be affected by the external and internal factors of 
organizational behavior. 
2. The Development of International Relations 
The realist theories of international relations provide only limited insight into the 
actual, day-to-day interactions between the United States and Mexico in regard to border 
security and the consumption of labor. Kenneth Waltz, in his Theory of International 
Relation, theorizes that nations exist in a state of anarchy and seek survival over raw 
power.7  The reader could interpret the lack of physical military conflict between Mexico 
and the United States after 1917 as a survival mechanism for the Mexican government, 
but the more basic tenants of realism do not adequately describe the relationship between 
the United States and Mexico. Clearly, the relationship between the United States and 
Mexico is no longer defined by anarchy and a basic fear for the survival of the nation-
state, but are rather defined instead by a set of norms that characterize relations built over 
time.8   
As the relationship between the United States and Mexico does not exist in a 
vacuum, some process must have contributed to the development of roles of each nation. 
In The Impact of Norms in International Society, Arie Kacowicz describes a Cognitive 
Process in which cognitive evolution serves “as a framework for understanding the 
dynamics and evolution of international norms over time.”9  This adaptive process of 
normalization between states is composed of three processes: innovation, selection, and 
diffusion. Innovation is the creation of new norms and understandings; selection 
constitutes the political process that selects certain policies for prolonged 
implementation, and diffusion is the system through which change is implemented 
                                                 
7 Summarized in John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 2001), 15. 
8 Arie Kacowicz, The Impact of Norms in International Society (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2005), 30. 
9 Ibid., 32. 
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throughout the transnational system.10  While change in international norms is useful in 
examining the evolution of the border security and labor relationship between the United 
States and Mexico, it does not describe why particular changes take place, or how they 
are formed. 
Prior to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, some scholars envisioned a 
new era of economic and social integration in North America. One school envisioned a 
“borderless world” where commerce can flow freely, and economic ties bring prosperity 
to all.11  Writing in 1996, Richard Rosecrance championed the idea that the world is 
developing into a “virtual state” where the economy of each country is “reliant on mobile 
factors of production.”12  In addition, Rosecrance states: “Developed states are putting 
aside military, political, and territorial ambitions as they struggle not for cultural 
dominance but for a greater share of world output.”13  In an economic light, the idea of a 
virtual state is useful. For example, passage of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) has allowed American corporations to shift industrial production to 
Mexico, from which the finished products are re-imported back into the United States. 
According to Robert Pastor, the “social and economic integration” of North American 
has created the largest and most productive free trade area in the world. Economic and 
social integration between Mexico and the United States has been particularly intense, 
with 21% of Mexican families receiving remittances from family members in the United 
States. Remittances from the Mexicans working in the United States are substantial, 
amounting to approximately 17 million dollars per day in 2000.14  Although the 
economic and social ties between the U.S. and Mexico have become increasingly close, 
 
 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Peter Andreas, Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2009), 5. 
12 Richard Rosecrance, “The Rise of the Virtual State,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4, (1996): 47. 
13 Ibid., 45. 
14 Robert Pastor, “Beyond NAFTA: The Emergence and Future of North America, in North American 
Politics: Globalization and Culture, eds. Yasmeen Abu-Laban, Radha Jhapan, and Francois Rocher 
(Toronto: Broadview Press, 2007), 5. 
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the United States has increasingly sought to secure its physical border with Mexico. The 
duel goals of expanding trade while ensuring a secure physical border work at cross-
purposes.   
3. Securitization: A Framework of Analysis 
Just as the relationship between the United States and Mexico is not anarchic as 
theorized by political realists, the reality of commerce and security do not always 
coincide with the free trade and open borders of economic liberals. How then can we 
analyze the normative changes that characterize the relationships that affect the U.S.-
Mexico border and the constant flow of migrant labor, drugs, and goods smuggled both 
north and south of the border?  In Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Barry Buzan, 
et al., moves the study of security issues away from strictly military applications and into 
the realm of economic and political discourse. Buzan’s security analysis framework 
expands beyond the military sector and allows for the inclusion of the political, 
environmental, economic, and societal sectors as areas for security analysis. According to 
Buzan: “the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the inter-
subjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects.”15 Securitization can be studied directly through the 
discourse between the political actors that control a situation: i.e., migrant labor policy.16 
The long and varied labor and border security relationship provides ample opportunity for 
examining all aspects of the U.S.-Mexico border relationship through the lens of 
securitization. 
4. Ineffective Policy as Good Politics 
In stark contrast to the optimistic views of the proponents of the “virtual state” is 
the opinion that the U.S.-Mexico border relationship is moving toward an environment 
that requires much stricter control of territory despite a massive expansion of trade post-
NAFTA. Border Games, by Peter Andreas, describes how the United States has 
                                                 
15 Buzan et al., Security, 25. 
16 Ibid. 
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reasserted state sovereignty through securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border by 
implementing policies that emphasize form over function and often have contradictory 
goals. Andreas notes that the United States border has never been under full “control” by 
the United States, and early attempts to increase border security, such as Richard Nixon’s 
“Operation Intercept” in 1969, was aimed at narcotics smuggling, not migrants or 
terrorists.17  Andreas goes further, noting that almost all of the migration and law 
enforcement efforts directed at the border have been superficial in nature, caused by 
political demand to “take action” without creating an economic disturbance in the 
increasingly integrated economies of the United States and Mexico. Andreas notes that 
political expediency has been the hallmark of United States policy toward its southern 
neighbor and has emphasized physical border deterrents without providing real incentive 
for U.S. companies to avoid the use of illegal migrant labor. After the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, politicians in the United State have been under increased pressure to 
provide a “100 percent” secure border without compromising free trade. The addition of 
counter-terrorism to the task of securing the border has only increased the size and 
complexity of the problem.18  
5. Conclusion 
International relations theory is of limited usefulness for describing the 
development of the relationship between the United States and Mexico. Clearly, the 
relationship between the United States and Mexico does not exist in a “realist” theoretical 
state of perpetual anarchy where each state continuously struggles for survival. Instead, 
the U.S.-Mexico relationship is marked by a continuous development of dialog through 
extensive trade and political connections. A large border, major cross-border immigration 
flows, and significant economic ties between the two nations in the post-1917 era means 
that security situations are more likely to develop in the economic, social, and political 
sectors rather that military sector. The framework of analysis proposed by Barry Buzan 
                                                 
17 Andreas, Border Games, 29, 41. 
18 Peter Andreas, “A Tale of Two Borders: The U.S.-Canada and the U.S.-Mexico Lines After 9–11,” 
The Rebordering of North America, eds. Peter Andreas and Thomas Biersteker (New York: Routledge 
2003), 2–3. 
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allows for the study of why economic, social, and political sectors transform into issues of 
“security.”  Peter Andreas illustrates how government policy is often limited in its ability 
to deal with given security situations, either by design or through the organizations tasked 
with implementation.   
E. METHODS  
This thesis will utilize two conceptual tools to create a new framework to analyze 
the creation and implementation of United States border security and labor policy with 
Mexico. The first tool of policy analysis utilized to build the framework for this thesis is 
the security analysis paradigm proposed by Barry Buzan, et al., in Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis. According to Buzan, “In security discourse, an issue is 
dramatized and presented as an issue of supreme importance; thus, by labeling it as 
security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means.”19  
Some of the “extraordinary” methods implemented by the United States in dealing with 
security and immigration issues along its southern border have included military 
incursions into Mexico, wholesale deportation of Mexican migrants, offers of amnesty 
for illegal workers, and the construction of walls and checkpoints along the U.S.-Mexican 
border. As a tool of analysis, securitization allows for the various policies implemented 
by the U.S. government to deal with migration and border control to be examined as 
economic security, societal security, and political security issues. The ability to examine 
major milestones in United States policy in regard to Mexican migration and border 
control through the subsets of economy, societal issues, and the political sector adds 
depth to the analysis.   
The second conceptual tool utilized in this thesis to build a new framework for 
analysis is organizational behavior. The word “organization” comes from the Greek 
organon, meaning a tool or instrument. An organization is a tool or an instrument that 
enables a user or a group to achieve an objective.20 According to Gareth Morgan in 
                                                 
19 Buzan et al., Security, 26. 
20 Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization: The Executive Edition (San Francisco: Berret-Koehler 
Publishers, 1998), 21. 
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Images of Organization, all theories that explain the behavior of different organizations 
are based upon “images, or metaphors, that lead us to understand situations in powerful 
yet partial ways.”21  Metaphors are a “force through which humans create meaning by 
using one element of experience to understand another.”22  An example of an 
organizational metaphor is the description of an organization as a machine. If an 
organization is like a machine, then we can infer that the organization is rigid, rationally 
designed to perform a specific task, and the organization produces repeatable results.23  
One important issue when describing organizational theories through metaphors is that 
while metaphors create new ways of seeing and acting, “metaphors tend to create ways of 
not seeing and acting.”24  Metaphors help people to understand issues, but they also tend 
to limit discourse.     
This thesis will utilize two behavioral models as tools for its framework of 
analysis. First, according to the Organizational Behavior Model, the policies 
implemented by government agencies are a result of their organizational function. By 
examining the resources and stated mission of an organization, it is possible to better 
understand why they undertake certain actions.25  For example, metrics used as a measure 
of success can influence policy implemented. In regard to the U.S.-Mexican border, the 
numbers of Mexicans detained at the border have alternately been used as a measure of 
policy success or failure depending upon the policy in force at the time.26  Of particular 
relevance to the discussion of border security are the catalysts of organizational learning 
and change. When government leaders are committed to major change in an organization, 
a budgetary feast can be used to rapidly build capacity for a change in an organizations 
mission, and to rapidly enhance the perceived effectiveness of an organizations original 
mission.27  Conversely, a prolonged budgetary famine can reduce the ability of a 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 3–4. 
22 Ibid., 4. 
23 Ibid., 17. 
24 Ibid., 21. 
25 Allison and Zelikow, Essence, 5.  
26 Andreas, Border Games, 93. 
27 Allison and Zelikow, Essence, 171–172. 
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government institution to perform key functions, and may force and organization to 
streamline or change mission all together.28  As organizations tend to have firmly 
established cultures that resist change, even with major changes in funding, a dramatic 
performance failure can serve as the catalysts for major organizational change.29  The 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have been perceived as a dramatic performance 
failure for multiple U.S. Government agencies, and the resulting major reorganization 
and consolidation of U.S. customs and immigration services under the Department of 
Homeland Security have reshaped the role of these organizations. 
The Government Politics model helps the analyst to understand the factors that 
shape the decisions by government stakeholder, their perceptions, and their ability to 
make decisions within their sphere of authority.30  The Government Politics model differs 
from the Organizational Behavior model in that organizational behavior produces a 
certain output based upon institutional design, where as the output of the Government 
Politics model is the result of bargaining among political actors and outcomes are formed 
by preferences for competing objectives.31  The Government Politics model is especially 
useful when considering the U.S.-Mexico border relationship because it accounts for 
large number of actors with contradictory goals, and the need for politicians to satisfy 
those actors. The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 provides an 
excellent example of the political bargaining that occurs to satisfy all relevant actors. The 
IRCA implemented the first sanctions against employers who “knowingly” employed 
illegal migrants as labor, but the legislation was loosely worded as to make workplace 
enforcement nearly impossible to enforce.32  The process of political bargaining satisfied 
law makers who wanted to utilize the IRCA to “get tough” on immigration, while 
businesses who employed illegal migrant labor were able to successfully lobby for vague 
enforcement legislation that enabled them to continue operating as before. Bargaining 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 172. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 6. 
31 Ibid., 255. 
32 Andreas, Border Games, 38–39. 
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allowed both sides to achieve a satisfactory version of their preferences without creating 
a major change in the system. 
1.  Framework of Analysis 
This thesis will utilize securitization to study why policy is created, and then 
utilize organizational behavior theory to analyze how policy is implemented. A 
framework of analysis that incorporates organizational behavior with securitization is 
necessary because, while securitization describes how policies are shaped and limited by 
speech acts, securitization only partially describes how those policies are implemented.    
Organizations are responsible for carrying out the policies that are produced when a 
political, economic, or social issue is addressed as a national security threat. Although 
securitization implies an extraordinary policy response to a perceived threat, 
organizations and institutions tasked with implementing policy still compete for limited 
resources, battle ingrained organizational culture, and are limited by their institutional 
mission in their ability to respond to various threats. To understand how and why 
organizations implement policy in a certain manner, we must examine why the policy 
was implemented, and then examine the resources available to implement the policy. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter II will describe relevant political speech acts that have used the issue of 
security to shape the United States’ policies in regard to Mexican labor, migration, and 
border from the consolidation of the border region to the end of the Bracero program in 
1964. Chapter III will analyze how the organizational structure and mission of multiple 
branches of the United States government tasked with implementing border security and 
labor policy has influenced how those agencies carried out their assigned tasking. 
Chapter IV will offer conclusions on how the securitization of the political, economic, 




II. BORDER CONSOLIDATION, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND 
BRACEROS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze how securitizing acts shaped United States policy in 
regard to the usage of Mexican contract labor and ask the question: did securitizing actors 
successfully securitize the usage of Mexican labor in the United States from 1917 to 
1964?  First, a brief overview of the security relationship between the United States and 
Mexico from 1821 to 1917 is provided in order to show how securitizing actions can take 
different forms based upon the type of security relationship that exists between two 
nations. Second, this chapter will describe how securitizing acts and the use of Mexican 
labor in the United States during WWI set the stage for a much larger contract-labor 
program during WWII. Third, this chapter will describe the contract-labor policies 
implemented by the United States from 1942 to 1964. Finally, this chapter will identify 
and analyze securitizing acts and actors, and their effects on the securitization of Mexican 
contract labor by the United States from 1917 to 1964. 
B. BORDER CONSOLIDATION 
Securitization as a tool of analysis presumes that an existential threat, either real 
or imagined, exists in such a way as to create “substantial political effects…that 
legitimize the breaking of rules.”33  Therefore, historically, can the interactions between 
the United States and Mexico from 1821 to 1917 be described as a securitized 
relationship?  If the answer is yes, how has the perception of border security between the 
two nations changed?  By answering the preceding questions, this section will lay the 
foundation for further analysis of the U.S-Mexico border security relationship post-1917. 
1. The United States-Mexico Relationship: 1821–1917 
In 1821, a newly independent Mexico found itself in possession of a vast North 
American territory while the United States of America pursued its manifest destiny to 
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expand to the Pacific Ocean. Tensions between Mexico and the United States eventually 
evolved into armed conflict, first with the secession of Texas from Mexico in 1836, and 
once again in the Mexican-American war of 1846–1848, in which Mexico lost 50% of its 
territory.34  Under the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, ratified 30 May 1848, Mexico gave 
up all claim to Texas “and agreed to a new frontier with the United States: from the 
mouth of the Rio Grande to the southern boundary of New Mexico, then west to a point 
just south of San Diego, California.”35  From the establishment of the final U.S.- Mexico 
border following the Gadsden Purchase in 1853 to approximately 1917, the border area 
remained a site of frequent conflict in which Anglo settlers attempted to pacify mexicano 
and Native American resistance.36  Especially in the Lower Rio Grande Valley, 
consolidation by incoming Anglo settlers frequently resulted in bloody clashes with 
Texans of Mexican ancestry. During the 1859–1860 Cortina War around Brownsville, 
Texas, mexicano residents of the Lower Rio Grande Valley staged a small-scale rebellion 
to protest manipulation of land claims, the murder of Texas Mexicans by Anglo settlers, 
and pervasive racism against the resident Mexican population. The rebellion was put 
down by a force of Texas Rangers and U.S. Army soldiers, resulting in prolonged and 
bloody retaliation by Anglo settlers against the mexicano population.37  Violence flared 
again from 1915 to mid-1916 as mexicano residents of the Lower Rio Grande Valley took 
up arms against Anglo settlers.38  The mexicano rebels, numbering between 1,000 to 
3,000 men, raided Anglo farms, railroads, and other targets, with attacks peaking between 
July and November 1915. Rebel attacks in the Lower Rio Grande Valley claimed the 
lives of 62 Anglo civilians and 64 U.S. soldiers, and displaced another 30,000 from their 
homes. The Texas Rangers led a brutal response against the mexicano rebels, with widely 
varying estimates between 300 to 5000 Mexicans killed by the Rangers and the Army.39  
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The fearsome response to the rebels by both the Texas Rangers and the U.S. Army 
essentially ended armed rebellion in the Lower Rio Grande Valley and finally 
subordinated the local mexicano population to Anglo domination.40   
The Mexican Revolution and the entry of the United States into WWI increased 
border militarization in a number of ways. First, in a example of what we would today 
call “spillover violence” from the 1910 Mexican Revolution resulted in the border 
deployment of 100,000 U.S. National Guard soldiers and a 1916 punitive expedition by 
U.S. troops into Mexico in response to cross-border raids.41  Second, the United States 
perceived a military threat from Germany agents operating from Mexico. In the midst of 
fears of German subversion from across the Mexican border, respected newspapers 
carried reports of masses of Mexicans leaving the United States in order to return to 
Mexico and fight against the United States. From the 7 April 1917 edition of the Los 
Angeles Times: 
Several thousand Mexican laborers have recently stopped work in the 
vicinity of Los Angeles and have left for Mexico…The disappearance of 
the Mexicans is accompanied by the report to the Sheriff that the men are 
armed and have been paid to go to Mexico to fight against the 
Americans…German agents have been active for months among the 
Mexicans, arranging with them to return to Mexico if there should be a 
breach of relations between Germany and America.[42] 
While stories of masses of Mexicans running off from their homes in the United 
States to take up armed struggle on behalf of Germany proved to be little more that 
paranoia, the idea that Mexicans constituted an internal military threat to the United 
States were prevalent enough that the Mexican community in the United States took 
action on the subject. Under the bold headline “MEXICANS TO PLEDGE 
ADHERENCE TO THE ALLIES,” newspapers reported on how the “Mexican colony” 
of Los Angeles planned to show their allegiance to the United States and the allied 
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cause.43  Multiple factors, including old rivalries and prejudices, the instability caused by 
the Mexican revolution, fear of German influence, and the uncertainties caused by the 
entry of the United States into WWI reinforced the idea that the border was a violent area 
that constituted a genuine security threat. 
The 1917 loyalty pledge by the Mexican colony of Los Angeles raises an 
important point: in a nation or society with a relatively free press, the objects of 
securitizing actions have the potential to make speech acts of their own. Essentially, by 
issue a public declarative statement of their loyalty to the United States, the Mexican 
colony in Los Angeles made a de-securitizing speech act. Just as securitizing actors can 
make declarative statements justifying extreme action, de-securitizing speech acts can be 
made by individuals or groups in order to reshape a public dialogue. De-securitizing 
speech acts may be just as important as securitizing speech acts, as both are utilized to 
shape the policy depending upon the nature of the security threat.  
Can the U.S.-Mexico relationship from 1821 to 1917 be described as a securitized 
relationship?  For the military sector of securitization, the answer is yes. According to 
Buzan’s framework of analysis: “When securitization is focused on external threats, 
military security is primarily about the two-level interplay between the actual armed 
offensive capabilities of states on one hand and their perceptions about each other’s 
capabilities and intentions on the other.”44  From the secession of Texas in 1836 to 
approximately 1917, interactions between the United States and Mexico focused on the 
external threat presented by the other nation. During that time, the relationship between 
the United States and Mexico involved one full-scale war in which Mexico lost 50% of 
its best territory, multiple European military expeditions in Mexican territory that nearly 
drew the United States into military intervention, the seizure of Veracruz by the United 
States in 1914, an American Army expedition into Mexico in 1916, and innumerable 
cross-border raids conducted by Indians and outlaws from both countries.45  The 1910 
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Mexican Revolution created an additional element of instability that provoked a military 
response from the United States in which the U.S. military forces were deployed to 
“secure” the border with Mexico.   
As the relationship between the United States and Mexico progressed during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the dynamic between the two nations changed 
from a hostile relationship between two near-peer competitors into a relationship between 
a heavily armed and economically successful United States and a Mexican state torn by 
revolutionary strife. Militarily, Mexico lost practically every military confrontation with 
the United States. Therefore, as time progressed, the perception of Mexico as a military 
threat to the United States lost credibility. Because perceptions of “threats, vulnerability, 
and (in)security are socially constructed,” as the U.S. entered WWI, United States policy 
makers de-securitized the idea of Mexico as a security threat and move toward a 
securitization of Mexican labor that could be utilized as a national security asset by the 
United States.46   
C. WORLD WAR I AND BRACEROS 
The Mexican Revolution and WW I marked a turning point in relations between 
the United States and Mexico. As it became more obvious that Mexico was not a German 
puppet bent upon attacking the United States, political and industrial leaders in the U.S. 
de-securitized Mexico as military threat and shifted their securitizing acts to frame 
Mexican labor as a national security asset for the United States. The new relationship was 
no longer based strictly on physical security in the military sense, but rather based upon 
security brought about by economic and social interaction. From 1917 to 1964, 
securitizing acts played a major role in shaping United States public policy toward the 
use of Mexican labor.  
1. Mexican Labor: A National Security Asset 
United States guest worker policies created to import and export Mexican labor as 
a national security commodity are illustrative of how policy can be shaped by securitizing 
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acts. While the United States treated the U.S.-Mexico border consolidation of 1821–1917 
as a physical security threat requiring the deployment of soldiers and paramilitary type 
forces, the entry of the United States into WWI reshaped the security dialog between the 
United States and Mexico. To deal with the increased labor demands of a wartime 
economy and to compensate for large numbers of able-bodied American males consigned 
to military service, the United States, in limited partnership with Mexico, initiated the 
Bracero program. The Bracero program was a legal framework that created a mechanism 
for bringing Mexicans as laborers into the United States in support of the war effort. A 
“test run” of recruited Mexican labor was implemented in California in 1917, while full 
implementation of the Bracero program began in June 1918 with the stated purpose of 
admitting Mexicans into the United States: “To Fill [labor] Shortage During the War.”47  
In 1918, while serving in President Woodrow Wilson’s cabinet as Food Administrator, 
future American President Herbert Hoover wrote: “all these restrictions [on obtaining 
Mexican labor] should be removed if possible in the immediate future. We need every bit 
of labor we can get and we need it badly…”48 War-time necessity helped to de-securitize 
the military relationship between the United States and Mexico while securitizing actors 
reframed the national dialog to utilize Mexican labor as a national security asset. 
The WWI Bracero program, which lasted from mid-1917 to December 1918, 
instituted a number of features that would be utilized in later programs.49  First, the WWI 
program was always advertised as temporary, with extra emphasis that all of the 
contracted labor would be returned to Mexico at the end of the war, whenever that might 
be.50  Second, in an attempt to dispel fears that Mexican labor would drive down the 
wages of domestic American workers, government officials emphasized that braceros 
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would be paid the same prevailing wages as domestic workers. Third, braceros were to 
be admitted only for work in agriculture, mining, and railroad maintenance. Fourth, 
farmers were to garnish a portion of the wages earned by each bracero and deposit the 
funds into a saving account that could only be accessed when the worker returned to 
Mexico.51  When taken together, these measures were designed to show the general 
public that the program was not only a wartime necessary, but also temporary with 
minimal impact upon domestic American workers. 
The WWI Bracero program was sufficiently successful that a much larger 
Bracero program was initiated in 1942 to support the American wartime agriculture and 
railroad industries. Although it was designed to serve as temporary labor relief during 
wartime, the second Bracero program lasted into 1964.52  From 1942 through 1964, the 
Bracero program recruited approximately 2 million Mexicans to perform manual labor in 
the United States, and according to some authors, laid the foundation for the current 
reliance of the U.S. agricultural upon cheap manual labor.53  While the Bracero program 
was justified as a national security necessity during wartime, multiple securitizing actors 
created sufficient pressure to ensure the program continued until 1964. 
D. THE BRACERO PROGRAM: 1942–1964 
Securitization implies that extraordinary measures are implemented to deal with 
issues that are presented as existential threats to national security. The WWII Bracero 
program was a key piece of United States government policy that was enacted to deal 
with a perceived existential threat to the United States. As WWII was a total war for the 
United States, the war effort placed great demands on every sector of society and the 
securitization of Mexican labor in support of the war effort became an issue once again.54 
This raises the question: if the 1942 Bracero agreement was a wartime measure 
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temporarily implemented in response to a national emergency, how did the program 
continue all the way through 1964?  In order to provide background information for 
further analysis, this section will describe the three main phases of the Bracero program: 
1942–1947, 1948–1951, and 1951–1964.  
1. The Bracero Agreement: 1942 to 1947 
As manpower intensive businesses in the American southwest grew increasingly 
vocal about their need for access to Mexican labor, agents of the United States 
government began to study the feasibility of utilizing Mexican labor as a stopgap 
measure during the national war emergency. First, in April 1942, the INS formed an 
interagency working group with representatives from the War Manpower Commission 
and the Departments of Labor, State, Justice, and Agriculture to create a plan for the 
recruitment and usage of Mexican labor in support of the war effort.55  When Mexico 
joined the war against the Axis powers on 1 June 1942, the American attorney general 
immediately asked the state department to enter into negotiations with the Mexican 
government for an accord to bring Mexican labor into the United States. On June 15 
1942, the American ambassador to Mexico met with the Mexican foreign minister “and 
urged, in the name of the war effort, Mexican approval of such a program.”56  The 
Mexican government, having anticipated such a request, had already established a 
committee to study the implications of a guest worker program with the United States.57  
Formal negotiations for the accord commenced 13 July 1942 in Mexico city, and were 
quickly completed due to prior staff work, adroit negotiation skills from representatives 
of both governments, and the common urgency brought about by the pressures of WWII. 
The 1942 Bracero Agreement “was signed July 23 and made effective by an exchange of 
diplomatic notes on August 4, 1942.”58  The 1942 Bracero agreement would serve as the 
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legislative foundation for the importation of Mexican labor into the United States from 
1942 to 1947.59 
The 1942 Bracero program upon four guiding principles. In return for access to 
Mexican labor, the United States agreed to the following: braceros could not be drafted 
into the U.S. military, braceros would be protected from discrimination, transportation 
back to Mexico would be provided by the U.S., and braceros would not be utilized to 
drive down the wages of U.S. domestic workers.60  Mexicans were screened by at 
processing centers in Mexico, and then sent by rail to work in the United States.61 
Operating under these basic principles, the Bracero program was quickly implemented, 
with 4,000 Mexicans entering the United States as contract labor in 1942. By the end of 
the wartime emergency program in 1947, 219,546 Mexicans legally worked in the United 
States in support of the war effort.62   
In many ways the 1942 Bracero agreement was an extraordinary measure 
afforded by the securitization of Mexican labor by the United States. First, unlike the 
WWI agreement, the WWII Bracero program was an accord between two governments, 
which was an extraordinary advance in relations between the United States and Mexico.63  
During WWI, the Mexican government had to deal with a cumbersome process of 
dealing with labor issues through diplomatic channels to address complaints against 
individual employers. Under the 1942 agreement, the employer of Mexican labor was the 
United States government through the Farm Security Administration, which greatly 
enhanced the ability of the Mexican government to address the grievances of its citizens 
employed under the Bracero agreement through direct government-to-government 
interaction.64    Second, braceros were guaranteed three things that the United States 
government refused to guarantee its own citizens: employment, a certain minimal level of 
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compensation, and adequate housing.65  Considering that the 1942 Bracero Agreement 
was successfully negotiated and implemented by two nations that had previously shared a 
significantly strained relationship prior to WWII, the program was generally considered 
to be a resounding success. 
2. The Bracero Agreement: 1948 to 1951 
The Bracero program from 1948 to 1951 is illustrative of the effects of de-
securitization upon a previously exceptional program. Without an urgent securitizing 
factor (the wartime need for labor), securitizing actions lost their power to motivate 
stakeholders. First, in the United States, the legislative basis for the 1942 to 1947 Bracero 
program (United States Public Law 45) expired on 31 December 1947, and responsibility 
for the administration of the program reverted back to the Department of Labor from the 
Department of Agriculture.66  From January 1948 to July 1951, the only legal basis for 
the continuation of the Bracero program was found in the 9th provision of section 3 of the 
Immigration Act of 1917, which allowed for the temporary employment of essential 
foreign workers.67  Second, during 1948, many of the extraordinary guarantees that had 
protected Mexican workers during the WWII program were eliminated. Work contracts 
were no longer government-to-government; they were between individual workers and 
farmers. Wage stipulations, piecework price stipulations, and unemployment insurance 
for braceros were also eliminated.68 
Compared to the highly successful WWII program, the Bracero program was a 
low point for three of the four participating groups. For the United States government, the 
program ran with little oversight due to a lack of legislative basis. With growers in the 
southwestern United States continuing to use the excuse of “drastic crop loss” as a reason 
for the postwar continuation of the program, and with a two-thousand mile border to 
patrol with only a small force, the American government decided that a program to 
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legally provide contracts for Mexican labor, no matter how poorly designed, was better 
than nothing.69  For United States labor leaders, the continued use of Mexican labor 
represented an affront to organized labor in the United States, and labor leaders continued 
to view the program as a way for big business to drive down the price of native labor.70   
The Mexican government was also displeased with the arrangement because the 
guarantees of the WWII agreement were eliminated during the 1948–1951 program, and 
they were displeased because the United States no longer served as the direct employer of 
the braceros. Despite a halt by the Mexican government to bracero contracting between 
October 1948 and August 1949, the Mexican government had little choice other than to 
continue the program due to the large cash remittances brought back to Mexico by the 
braceros, and by the realization that Mexican citizens would gladly enter the United 
States to find work illegally if no legal means was made available.71   
Only American farmers who employed Mexican labor were generally happy with 
the 1948–1951 Bracero program. The 1948–1951 program removed pay stipulations and 
allowed farmers to directly recruit labor for themselves, which was a feature of the WWI 
program that the farmers had continued to lobby for.72  Even the southwestern farmers 
managed to find parts of the 1948–1951 program to their disliking. Specifically, a U.S. 
government provision that required farmers to post a $25 dollar bond to ensure that each 
bracero returned to Mexico drew heavy criticism from farm owners, with the farmers 
complaining that they had no way of ensuring that braceros returned to Mexico.73 
Another unusual feature of the 1948 to 1951 Bracero program was the 
questionable practices utilized by United States law enforcement officials to recruit 
Mexican farm labors. From 1947 to 1949, approximately 74,000 braceros were recruited 
from the interior of Mexico. In the same time frame, 142,000 illegal Mexican immigrants 
who were already in the United States were “dried out” and allowed to sign bracero 
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contracts. Effectively, Mexican workers could skip the cumbersome recruitment process 
in Mexico and go straight to the United States to find work.74  With illegal immigration 
an increasingly important problem for both the United States and Mexico, it was in the 
best interests of both nations to complete a comprehensive reform the Bracero program. 
3. The Bracero Agreement: 1951 to 1964  
Just as WWI had stimulated the design of a Mexican guest worker program and 
WWII cemented the process in place, another national security dilemma reinvigorated the 
Bracero program. The entry of the United States into the Korean War in June 1950 
created another manpower “crisis” and a re-securitization of the manpower issue that was 
utilized to renegotiate the ailing Bracero program.75  Mexican displeasure with the 1948 
to 1951 agreement and the perceived need for Mexican labor in the United States led to 
significant renegotiation of the Bracero program. Negotiations led to the passage and 
implementation of Public Law 78 (PL78). PL78, signed into law 13 July 1951, added an 
amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1949 that institutionalized the Bracero program in 
United States law.76  After the signature of PL78, the United States and Mexico quickly 
reached a new Bracero accord, which was activated on 11 August 1951.77 
Similar to the 1942 to 1947 Bracero program, PL78 had several provisions to 
protect “native” United States workers from the affects of foreign contract labor. First, 
the secretary of labor had to certify that a shortage of American labor existed. Second, the 
secretary had to certify that American farmers had attempted to recruit domestic labor 
with wages and hours comparable to those offered to Mexicans. Finally, the secretary of 
labor had to certify that the use of braceros would not drive down the wages and working 
conditions of domestic American workers.78   
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PL78 granted the secretary of labor a number of extraordinary powers and 
responsibilities. A controversial element PL78 authorized the secretary to enroll illegal 
Mexican immigrants into the Bracero program if the immigrant had been in the United 
States for the proceeding five years. This measure, effectively the first “legalization” of 
illegal Mexicans in the United States, potentially served as a cost-saving method for the 
United States, as it allowed illegal Mexicans apprehended in the U.S. to be converted into 
legal labor through the signature of a Bracero contract. Aside from the issue of “national 
necessity” raised by securitizing actors, legalization of illegal Mexican workers through 
conversion to braceros was more a matter of cost and convenience for both the United 
States and Mexico. Legalization allowed the formerly illegal Mexican worker to be sent 
back to Mexico upon fulfillment of the work contract without additional costs for legal 
hearings. Effectively, legalization through the Bracero program provided an outlet that 
satisfied the needs of farmers, the U.S. government, and the government of Mexico. 
Farmers received workers who were conveniently already in the country, the United 
States was able to save on enforcement costs, and the Mexican government was able to 
reduce the number of Mexican migrants refusing to return to Mexico.79 
Along with the authority to essentially legalize Mexican workers who had been in 
the United States for more than five years, the secretary of labor was granted the 
authority to establish reception centers in the United States, provide medical care, 
sustenance, and transportation for braceros from Mexico to the U.S., assist in contract 
negotiations, and guarantee contract adherence by American farmers.80  Similar to the 
WWII program, the United States government provided Mexican workers rights and 
services that the government would not guarantee to its own citizens. 
E. SECURITIZING ACTIONS AND ACTORS 
For a subject to become fully securitized, an existential threat must be established 
with sufficient credibility that the threat creates substantial political effects.81  The 
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successful securitization of an issue is not decided by the securitizing actor, but rather 
through the acceptance, by the audience, that the security issue is an existential threat to a 
shared value or institution.82  In order to utilize speech acts to analyze the securitization 
of an issue, the analyst must identify referent objects, securitizing actors, and functional 
actors. Referent objects are the “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and 
that have a legitimate claim to survival.”83  For example, when the survival of a nation is 
threatened, the nation is the referent object. Securitizing actors are the actors who use 
speech acts to declare a threat to a referent object.84  If a politician declares that 
immigrants are a security threat to the nation, then the politician is the securitizing actor. 
Functional actors are actors that affect the dynamics of a sector and “significantly 
influence decisions in the field of security.”85  If a securitizing actor declares that migrant 
labor is essential for national defense, then the businesses that utilize that migrant labor 
are functional actors. This section will identify the referent objects, securitizing actors, 
and functional actors that helped shape the securitization of Mexican labor from 1917 to 
1964, and then analyze the effectiveness of the securitization process on shaping United 
States policy. 
1. Referent Objects and Securitizing Actors 
The study of the military and economic aspects of securitization is especially 
useful for studying the creation of the Bracero guest worker programs. During both WWI 
and WWII, the bracero programs were repeatedly justified as necessary for the success of 
the United States war effort. For the United States, both world wars were fought against 
other nation-states. Therefore, when studying the securitization of Mexican labor from a 
military aspect, the referent object is the survival of the state itself. The study of the 
securitization of labor from a strictly military viewpoint is problematic because the 
Bracero program lasted well past the end of WWII and it is unlikely that labor shortages 
alone could be viewed as an existential threat to the state.   
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The economic sector of securitization may add more insight into the securitization 
of Mexican labor. According to Buzan’s framework of security analysis, one of the 
agendas that can be classified as economic securitization is: “The ability of states to 
maintain independent capability for military production in a global market or…the 
relationship of the economy to the capability for state military mobilization.”86  
Proponents of the importation of Mexican contract labor argued that Mexican labor was 
essential to maintaining the ability of the United States to meet wartime agricultural 
production demands. If the government accepts the idea that a specific area of industry is 
necessary for the successful prosecution of a war, than that industry can be recognized as 
an economic referent object for securitization.87 
Two major groups of securitizing actors influenced the use of Mexican contract 
labor from 1917 to 1964. The first group of securitizing actors is the United States 
government and business leaders who advocated for the use of Mexican contract labor as 
a matter of wartime necessity. Whether Mexican labor was securitized as a national 
security asset to help fight the wars or preserve the economic sector, the United States 
government played an essential role, as the government was the only group that could 
actually implement policy. The second broad group of securitizing actors was comprised 
of special interest groups who advocated against the use of Mexican labor for a variety of 
economic and societal reasons. By breaking down these securitizing actors into functional 
groups, it is possible to analyze how securitization can shape government policy. 
2. Functional Actors and Government Politics 
Before the United States officially entered WWII in December 1941, farmers in 
the American southwest began to pressure their congressional representatives for 
unabated access to Mexican manpower for agricultural purposes. American born migrant 
farm workers, primarily from Arkansas and Oklahoma, traditionally filled the migrant 
worker needs of the southwest growers. Unfortunately for farmers in the American 
southwest, domestic American workers quickly found higher paying jobs in the rabidly 
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expanding defense industry.88  The passage of the Selective Service Act in September 
1940 and the National Defense Act in March 1941 created an even greater scarcity of 
available labor.89  By September 1941, California growers had become sufficiently 
concerned that they directly petitioned the INS for permission to directly contract 30,000 
workers from Mexico. The INS denied the request on grounds that sufficient American 
labor was available to meet production standards.90  The issue of whether or not 
sufficient “native” labor was available would continue to be a point of contention 
between agribusiness, labor leaders, and politicians during the entire Bracero program. 
From the beginning of the Bracero program, proponents of contracted Mexican 
labor argued for the program as a national defense measure. California Governor Culbert 
Olson telegraphed the secretaries of labor, state, and agriculture: “Without a substantial 
number of Mexicans, the situation is certain to be disastrous to the entire victory 
program, despite our united efforts to in the mobilization of youth and city dwellers for 
emergency farm work.”91  Governors of other agricultural states were not hesitant to join 
the effort to bring Mexican labor into the United States as an emergency measure. 
Governor Clark of Idaho illustrated his desire for emergency farm worker relief by 
personally hoeing sugar beet fields with his staff (with sufficient media coverage).92  
Agriculture was not the only business sector that requested the ability to recruit Mexican 
labor in support of the war effort.   
Similar to the American experiment with contracted Mexican labor during WWI, 
the railroad industry also campaigned for access to Mexican labor as a wartime necessity. 
In July 1942, W.H. Kirkbride, chief engineer for the Southern Pacific railroad, told 
reporters that the railroad needed access to Mexican labor because: “The traffic on our 
railroad is the heaviest in its history…and it is imperative that our tracks be maintained at 
                                                 
88 Craig, Bracero Program, 37. 
89 Ibid., 38. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 39 
92 “Mexico Labor Use Backed: Wickard Tells Arizona and California He Will Aid Import Plan,” Los 
Angeles Times (1923-Current File), June 3, 1942;  ProQuest Historical Newspapers (Los Angeles Times 
[1881–1989]), 6. 
 29
the highest degree to safeguard the movement of war materials and men.”93  By 
appealing to the government for access to Mexican labor as a wartime necessity for the 
defense of the United States, business leaders moved the labor discussion out of the arena 
of normal political-business negotiation and into the realm of national security where 
extraordinary measures were more justifiable, as long as the extraordinary measures were 
in support of the national defense.94 
3. Special Interests  
From 1917 to 1964, the United States government faced pressure from a variety 
of special interests groups that frequently had contradictory positions on immigration, 
border security, and the use of Mexican labor. The massive expansion of irrigation and 
the resulting increase in land prices and requirement for cheap labor in the American 
Southwest in the 1920s coincided with the loss of European labor supplies, resulting in 
pressure from agriculturalists to maintain and increase the supply of Mexican labor.95  
When the U.S. Congress considered applying immigration quotas to Mexico in 1928, 
prominent Southwest Rancher Fred Bixby argued against the restrictions, stating: “We 
have no Chinamen, we have no Japs…and the white man will not do the work.”96  The 
1948 “El Paso” incident is even more illustrative of the pressure placed by the 
agricultural sector on public officials. Following an ongoing labor dispute between 
Mexico and growers in Texas, Mexico placed a restriction on the flow of braceros into 
Texas. Texas growers responded by petitioning the U.S. Border Patrol to open the border 
in violation of the bilateral agreement, which was a violation of the Border Patrol’s own 
policies. From 16 to 17 October 1948, the U.S. Border Patrol allowed 6,000 Mexicans 
into the United States at El Paso, and most of the workers went directly to Texas cotton 
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fields.97  The El Paso incident exemplifies the extreme pressure that agro-business could 
place upon parts of the U.S. government, and the willingness of government agencies to 
support business interests. 
While the U.S. Congress faced pressure to allow Mexican immigrants into the 
country from the expanding agricultural interests of the southwest, they also received 
pressure to stop immigration from the multiple sectors of society. Once again, the 
agricultural business sector was one of the key players attempting to influence the flow of 
Mexican labor. Congressman John Box of East Texas and Senator William Harris of 
Georgia introduced strong anti-immigration legislator with that would protect cotton 
production in the southeast by eliminating the cheap Mexican labor that was driving 
cotton production in the southwest.98  During the Great Depression, the U.S. government 
came under great pressure to remove Mexicans to open jobs for unemployed 
Americans.99  Pressure to control the border even forced the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) to take a contradictory enforcement position on Mexican 
labor. From 1947 to 1954, it was common practice for INS agents to apprehend illegal 
Mexicans and then allow those Mexicans to sign bracero contracts and remain in the 
United States. By “legalizing” the Mexicans through bracero contracts, the INS was able 
to claim that they were apprehending illegal workers while also satisfying the demands of 
employers by not removing the apprehended personnel from the U.S.100 The “shell 
game” of crafting policy that satisfies both sides of the immigration and labor issue was a 
necessary reality due to the desire of the United States government to pacify the various 
special interest groups on both sides of the border debate.   
4. Mexican Labor: A Economic and Societal Threat 
The same Mexicans who were considered as essential national security assets 
during wartime and as essential cheap labor during economic boom-times were swiftly 
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rebranded as threats to the economic and social security of American when the economy 
performed poorly. Following the mass importation of Mexican agricultural labor during 
WWI, Mexicans were scapegoated for causing unemployment among American cotton 
workers during the recession of 1920–1922, and many Mexicans were deported en-
mass.101  Herbert Hoover, the food administrator who had lobbied for the mass use of 
Mexican labor during WWI, implemented the mass deportation of Mexicans during the 
Great Depression to open jobs for “real” Americans.102  From 1930 to 1939, Mexicans 
constituted 46.3% of all of the people deported from the United States, despite 
compromising less than 1% of the U.S. population.103  After WWII, the United States 
pursued a duel program of expanded use of bracero labor while also pursuing an 
aggressive deportation program. Under the 1954 “Operation Wetback,” United States 
Attorney General Howard Brownell appointed former Army Lieutenant General Joseph 
Swing to lead a task force to push Mexicans back over the border. While an estimated 1 
million Mexicans were deported or returned to Mexico under the initiative, Operation 
Wetback, which occurred at the height of the Bracero program, illustrated the duel nature 
of American policy toward Mexican labor: “We want you as labor, but on our terms.”104   
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III. EFFECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR ON THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF UNITED STATES BORDER SECURITY 
AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
While government actors create policy, organizations actually implement policy 
in the “real world.”  The outcome of a government law or policy, therefore, can be 
seriously affected by how a particular institution implements the policy. In turn, the 
methods by which an agency implements policy can be influenced by organizational 
factors such as mission, resources, and incentives. By examining two significant events in 
the early development if the United States Border Patrol (USBP) and the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS), this chapter will analyze how organizational behavior 
influenced the implementation of United States border security and immigration policy. 
First, initial Border Patrol operations in the 1920s and 1930s were negatively affected by 
the lack of a clear mission and broad powers, which incentivized an organizational focus 
on the apprehension of Mexican nationals during the Great Depression. Second, 
mounting political pressure in the late 1940s and early 1950s to curb illegal immigration 
across the U.S-Mexico border incentivized multiple changes in INS enforcement tactics. 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR THEORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF INCENTIVES TO APPREHEND MEXICAN NATIONALS 
1. Mission Development of the United States Border Patrol 
According to the Organizational Behavior model presented by Graham Allison 
and Philip Zelikow, “government organizations have formal charters that specify their 
authorities, the arenas in which they are directed to operate, and activities that are 
forbidden.”105  Problems arise, however, when a government organization is not given a 
clear mission and the organization is left on its own to develop with little guidance, as 
“organizations interpret mandates into their own terms.”106  Once an organization has a 
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mission statement, it is up to the members of the organization to create institutions 
capable of fulfilling the stated mission.107  For the USBP, the lack of a clearly defined 
mission eventually led to an emphasis on the apprehension and deportation of Mexican 
nationals during the Great Depression of 1929–1939. 
When the United States Border Patrol was created in May 1924 under Public Law 
Number 153 (PL153), the legislation was sufficiently vague that the Bureau of 
Immigration was unsure of the authority or mandate of the new patrol organization.108  
Even the Commissioner-General of the Bureau of Immigration was uncertain of the legal 
status of the new border patrol, writing on August 30, 1924: 
If the Bureau is right in its understanding of the matter, the border patrols 
are without the slightest authority to stop a vehicle crossing the border for 
the purposes of search, or otherwise, nor can they legally prevent the entry 
of an alien in violation of the law. In other words, they possess no more 
powers than does the ordinary citizen, who can exercise police powers 
only at the request of a duly constituted officer of the law, or to prevent 
the commission of a felony.109 
On 27 February 1925, the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 502 (PL502), which 
granted the new Border Patrol broad law enforcement powers.110  Specifically, PL502 
gave Border Patrol officers the authority to “arrest any alien who in his presence or view 
is entering or attempting to enter the United States in violation of any law or regulation 
made in pursuance of law regulating the admission of aliens” and additional authority “to 
board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United States, 
railway car, conveyance, or vehicle in which he believes aliens are being brought into the 
United States.”111  In less than one year from its creation by act of Congress, the Border 
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Patrol went from having no clear mission or law enforcement authority to being vested 
with sweeping law enforcement powers. Granted broad powers with limited guidance and 
little organizational history, the new Border Patrol was driven by organizational 
restrictions and incentives to interpret their mandate that ultimately resulted in a focus on 
the apprehension and detention Mexican nationals living and working in the United 
States. From 1927 through the end of the Great Depression, organizational incentives 
forced a shift in immigration enforcement strategy away from “expensive” immigration 
enforcement efforts directed at European and Asia immigrants towards the readily 
available yet cheap to deport Mexican immigrant population. 
2. The Great Depression and an Increased Emphasis on the 
Apprehension of Mexican Nationals 
The 1930s are the only decade in the 20th century when more Mexicans migrated 
south back to Mexico than north into the United States.112  During the Great Depression, 
Mexican immigrants in the United States were the subjects of numerous securitizing 
actions that portrayed Mexican immigrants as threats to the economic and societal 
security of the United States. A combination of factors forced and/or convinced an 
estimated 500,000 to 1 millions Mexican immigrants to return to Mexico during the 
1930s.113  Among those factors was an institutional shift by the Bureau of Immigration 
(later the INS) and the USBP away from the exclusion of Chinese and European 
immigrants towards a program of systematic Mexican apprehension and deportation. 
Examination of the organizational incentives to focus on the apprehension and 
deportation of Mexican immigrants in the 1930s illustrates how organizational behavior 
influenced the implementation of securitized policies.  
Despite the institutional mission to prevent large-scale illegal immigration by 
Europeans into the United States, a lack of funding for the Bureau of Immigration and the 
Border Patrol, combined with the relative expense of deporting Europeans and Asians, 
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forced a compromise in enforcement methods that would lead to an almost exclusive 
focus on the apprehension and deportation of Mexican nationals.114  By 1927, the 
expense of immigration hearings and deportation costs for illegal European and Asian 
immigrants created budgetary shortfalls and forced the Bureau of Immigration to adopt a 
“Voluntary Return” (also referred to as the “Voluntary Departure) program for illegal 
immigrants from Canada and Mexico. Under the Voluntary Return (VR) program, illegal 
immigrants apprehended by the Bureau could “voluntarily” wave their right to a 
deportation hearing. In return for agreeing to wave the deportation hearing, the illegal 
immigrant was returned to their native country without incurring a deportation record. In 
a further attempt to save money, the Bureau of Immigration broadened the Border 
Patrol’s authority and allowed the USBP to carry out their VR program without oversight 
by the Immigration Bureau. Essential, the Immigration Bureau and Border Patrol faced a 
paradox. The mandate of the Immigration Bureau and Border Patrol encouraged the 
apprehension of illegal European and Asian immigrants while the expense of deporting 
the Europeans and Asians discouraged the activity.115  On the other hand, Mexican 
nations were quick and cheap to deport, but farmers and industrialists along the southern 
border were unhappy with border patrol efforts that disrupted the labor supply.116 
The cost of deporting illegal Chinese immigrants from the United States, 
specifically from 1930–1933, created organizational incentives for the Immigration 
Bureau and the Border Patrol to shift focus to the illegal Mexican population. From 1930 
to 1933, anti-Chinese hysteria in Mexico resulted in the Mexican government deporting 
Chinese immigrants to the United States. The mass influx of Chinese from Mexico into 
the United States stretched the budget of the Immigration Bureau and the USBP to the 
breaking point. From January 1932 to December 1933, 53 percent of the immigration 
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hearings in the U.S. District Court of Southern California were for people with Chinese 
names. The in FY32, the costs of deporting Chinese immigrants was so great that the 
Immigration Service furloughed its employees for thirty days and used the saving to pay 
for deportation costs.117  Other tactics to save costs included extending the VR program 
and the parole of large numbers of Mexicans held in detention facilities. Essentially, low 
cost incentivized the creation of the VR system in a fiscally constrained environment 
while simultaneously minimizing the administrative burden of deporting Mexicans from 
the United States.118   
While political actors securitized Mexicans as an economic and societal threat to 
the United States during the Great Depression of 1929–1939, organizational constraints 
and incentives encouraged the Immigration Service and USBP to focus enforcement on 
Mexican nationals working and living illegally in the United States. The high costs of 
deporting Europeans and Asians directly affected the livelihood of the law enforcement 
agents, and the streamlined processes initiated to save money occurred at a time that 
securitizing actors in the United States called for the deportation of Mexicans to protect 
the American economy. As a result, the percentage of Mexicans as a total of illegal 
immigrants apprehended and deported increased from 28.2 percent in 1931 to 52.7 
percent in 1939.119   
C. “OPERATION WETBACK” AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS. 
In August 1953, United States Attorney General Herbert Brownell stated that the 
growing number of illegal Mexican immigrants in the United States was: “a social, 
economic, political, and moral problem of the first magnitude.”120  State Attorney 
General Brown of California voiced a similar concern in 1954, calling illegal immigrants 
a “grave social problem, involving murder, prostitution, robbery, and narcotics 
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infiltration on a giant scale.”121  By 1954, the 309,033 legal braceros in the United States 
were vastly outnumbered by 1,074,277 known illegal immigrants.122  To make matters 
worse, many farmers were happy to avoid the cost of hiring braceros by hiring illegals 
instead, and some farmers in the Lower Rio Grande Valley physically opposed the efforts 
of USBP agents to apprehend illegal Mexican workers.123  In addition, American labor 
leaders were angered by the use of cheap Mexican labor to the detriment of domestic 
workers.124  By 1954, special interests from all corners of the societal, economic, and 
political world were deeply concerned with the issue of illegal Mexican labor. The 
response to the multiple concerns over the use of illegal Mexican labor in the U.S. is a 
useful example of how securitization of an issue can force an organization to produce a 
“solution” that is really no solution at all. 
The idea for a massive “final” operation to clear the border of illegal immigrants 
originated in 1953 with “Operation Cloudburst.”  In July of 1953, the head of the USBP, 
Harlon Carter, met with active-duty General Joseph Swing, USA, and California National 
Guard Adjutant General Jones to discuss the use of military troops to assist the USBP in a 
large operation to seal the border and remove the majority of illegal Mexican immigrants 
from the United States.125  General Swing enthusiastically agreed with the plan, and Mr. 
Carter appealed to President Eisenhower for a special presidential order to allow the 
military to participate in a civilian law-enforcement operation. President Eisenhower 
never gave the special order and Operation Cloudburst never look place, but the President 
Eisenhower did allow General Swing to retire from the Army in February 1954, and 
promptly appointed him as commissioner of the INS in May 1954.126   
As securitization of an issue implies that extraordinary measures must be 
implemented to address a threat, the appointment of General Swing as commissioner of 
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the INS indicated a new militarization of the U.S. immigration enforcement effort.127  
Within a month of taking charge, Commissioner Swing announced a new program 
similar to Operation Cloudburst that would lead to a secure border and end the problem 
of illegal Mexicans in the United States once and for all. Commissioner Swing 
temporarily re-assigned hundreds of USBP agents from Florida and the Canadian border 
to assist in the effort. Operations commenced 10 June 1954 with roadblocks in California 
and Arizona. After apprehending 10,917 illegal Mexicans in 8 days, the USBP agents 
switched tactics and reformed into special task groups that raided factories, restaurants, 
and any place that large numbers of illegal Mexican immigrants tended to gather.128  
USBP agents worked from north to south in California and Arizona before moving into 
Texas.129  In three months, the “Operation Wetback” task forces moved through 
California, Arizona, Texas, Illinois, and the Mississippi delta. By October 1954, 
Commissioner Swing declared that Operation Wetback had been a resounding success, 
with over one million illegal aliens removed from the U.S.130   
While it seems that the securitization of the illegal immigrant issue generated an 
extraordinary response, it is important to note the organizational factors that contributed 
to Operation Wetback. Organizational Behavior Theory indicates that: “each 
organization’s operational objectives emerge as a set of targets, flanked by constraints, 
that define performance of the critical task.”131  In regard to Operation Wetback, the 
operational target appears to have been the previously estimated 1 million illegal aliens 
living in the United States prior to the start of the operation. It is interesting to note that 
prior to Operation Wetback, the U.S. government was estimated that slightly more than 
one million illegal immigrants resided in the United States, and Commissioner Swing 
claimed to have apprehended almost that exact same number. It seems that Commissioner 
Swing felt that he had a mandate to take extreme action, and he may have “forced” the 
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apprehension numbers to match expectations. The 1,035,282 persons reported 
apprehended by the USBP in 1954 were for fiscal year 1954. As Operation Wetback 
commenced 10 June 1954, only 20 days of the operation occurred during fiscal year 
1954.132  Therefore, the number of apprehensions attributed by Commissioner Swing to 
Operation Wetback mostly occurred before the operation commenced.   
Once the organizational “goal” of removing the one million aliens from the U.S. 
was met, constraints placed upon the continued success of the INS and USBP could be 
quantified in the number of apprehensions after Operation Wetback. The apprehension 
numbers did fall dramatically after the conclusion of Operation Wetback, giving some 
credibility to Commissioner Swing’s claims to have ended the threat of illegal aliens 
from across the southern border. However, the drop in apprehension numbers after 1954 
was accompanied by a shift in tactics that Commissioner Swing did not mention. After 
the conclusion of Operation Wetback, the USBP reorganized from a Special Task Force 
organization designed to apprehend large numbers of illegal in “sweep and clear” 
operations and shifted back to 2-man teams patrolling the physical “line” of the U.S.-
Mexico border.133  The so-called “line patrols” were historically less productive than the 
large sweep and clear operations. By a simple change in tactics, Commissioner Swing 
ensured the continued “success” over illegal immigrants by utilizing less effective tactics 
that resulted in fewer apprehensions. Clearly, the securitization of illegal Mexican 
immigrants in the early 1950s created room for extraordinary measures, but the 
organizational behavior of the USBP and INS shaped and limited the effectiveness of 
their response.       
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IV. CONSEQUENCES OF SECURITIZATION AND 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR FOR THE BORDERLANDS 
A. SECURITIZATION: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
Was the consumption of Mexican labor successfully securitized by the United 
States from 1917 to 1964?  From 1917 to 1964, securitizing actors from widely varied 
parts of U.S. society portrayed Mexican labor in the United States alternately as a 
necessary and useful tool to be utilized as a national security asset during times of war; or 
as an existential threat to the American economy and society during economic 
downturns.   These two different narratives, Mexican labor as an asset or as a threat, were 
securitizing moves. As previously discussed, an “issue is securitized only if and when the 
audience accepts it as such.”134  In regard to the consumption of Mexican labor in the 
United States, the audience was never completely convinced of the necessity to utilize 
Mexican labor in times of war or the necessity to expel Mexican labor during times of 
crisis. Specifically, leaders of organized labor in the United States fervently disagreed 
with the implementation of WWII Bracero program.135  Post-WWII, opposition from 
groups concerned with the social consequences of the contractual use of Mexican 
workers united with labor leaders to end the Bracero program in 1964.136 
Similar to the mixed opinions on the necessity of utilizing Mexican labor as a 
national security asset, the American public did not fully accept that the Mexicans posed 
an existential threat to the economic and societal existence of the United States during the 
Great Depression. Social groups were created to support the Mexican community in the 
United States, and societal leaders publically advocated integration of the Mexican 
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population instead of deportation.137  Once again, despite public dissent towards the 
deportation and repatriation of Mexicans living in the United Stares, deportation 
programs proceeded throughout the country. In both cases; the use of Mexican labor as a 
national security asset and the deportation of Mexican nationals during economic crisis; 
public dissent by the audience did not stop the implementation of extraordinary 
securitizing measures. 
According to Buzan’s securitization framework, the securitization of Mexican 
labor in the United States was not successful because the audience did not entirely accept 
the argument, but the securitization process was effective in that the securitizing actors 
were able to create sufficient political capital to implement extraordinary policies without 
the complete support of all actors. This phenomenon raises a further question: does a 
securitizing action need the support of every actor to be considered successful, or just the 
support of enough actors to implement policy despite the objections of weaker parties? 
In regard to the securitization of Mexican labor in the United States as a national 
security asset, the primary securitizing actors were agriculturalists in the American 
southwest, politicians from those same states, and government leaders in Washington, 
D.C., American labor leaders were the major actors who did not accept the securitizing 
program. The failure of labor leaders to override the securitizing program is an indication 
of their relative to the power of the securitizing actors. Essentially, the actors who 
favored the securitization of Mexican labor as a national security asset were in position to 
make decisions and implement policy, while the opponents of the use of Mexican labor 
were not in positions powerful enough to stop the process. It appears that the acceptance 
of securitizing acts by the audience with the power to make and implement policy is a 
more important determining factor than the acceptance of securitizing acts by a society as 
a whole. 
The deportation and repatriation of Mexicans from the United States to Mexico 
during the Great Depression from 1929 to 1939 is another example of the relative power 
of securitizing actors. During the Great Depression, some American politicians and social 
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groups securitized Mexican immigrants as a economic and societal threat to the United 
States, while other groups constructed a counter-narrative that promoted Mexicans as 
hard working and invaluable members of U.S. society.138  Specific states implemented 
their own deportation programs, and rampant acts of intimidation against Mexican 
immigrants by a variety of members of American society convinced significant numbers 
of Mexicans to “self-deport.”139  While vocal members of society disagreed with the 
securitizing speech acts that labeled Mexicans as a threat, the securitizing actors with the 
power to make and implement policy were able to overcome opposition. It seems that for 
a securitizing act to be effective, consensus among the audience is not required, as long 
as the audience with the power to actually make policy agrees with the need to take the 
extraordinary actions implied by securitization acts. 
B. LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECURITIZATION OF 
MEXICAN LABOR 
 The major long-term consequence of the short-term securitization of Mexican 
labor was the establishment of persistent patterns of Mexican immigration to the United 
States. From 1955 to 1959, approximately 450,00 temporary Bracero workers and 50,000 
permanent residents entered the United States from Mexico each year while 
apprehensions of illegal aliens dropped year over year from 1954 to 1960.140 Due to the 
exemption of Mexico from immigration quota restrictions and relatively easy access to 
legal entry into the United States via the Bracero program, Mexican workers developed 
persistent cycles of migration in which they alternated between periods of work in the 
United States and then returned to Mexico to await the next work season. Until the end of 
the Bracero program in 1964, the cyclical nature of Mexican labor in the United States 
was supported by a legal process, and was therefore a matter of limited public concern.141  
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In 1965, two changes in U.S. law disrupted the cyclical flow of Mexican labor in the 
United States and resulted in a massive long-term increase in the illegal migration of 
Mexican labor in the United States. 
On 31 December 1964, Public Law 78 authorizing the Bracero program expired 
and was not renewed, effectively ending the legal use of seasonal Mexican labor in the 
United States.142  The Bracero program took three years to phase out, with zero new 
contracts issued in 1968.143  The end of the Bracero program coincided with the passage 
and implementation of Public Law 89–236 (the Immigration and Nationality Act 
Amendments of 1965). PL89–236 imposed the first immigration visa limit on countries 
in the Western Hemisphere, consisting of a 120,000-visa cap on countries in the Western 
Hemisphere to be implemented in 1968. In a further restriction on legal immigration from 
Mexico to the United States, Public Law 94–571 imposed a further limit of 20,000 visas 
per year per nation in the Western Hemisphere starting in 1977. Compounding the effect 
of the new laws on the cyclical Mexican labor force in the United States, PL89–236 
prohibited unskilled and seasonal labors from receiving employment-based Legal 
Permanent Resident (LPR) visas.144  Left with few legal methods to continue the season 
work cycle in the United States, Mexican laborers once again resorted to illegal 
immigration. 
As the “massive circular flow of Mexican migrants had become deeply embedded 
in employer practices and migrant expectations,” the lack of a legal mechanism for 
Mexicans to work in the United States post-1965 created a rapid rise in illegal 
immigration.145  From a low of approximately 40,000 apprehension in 1965, the number 
of illegal aliens apprehended tripled from 1965 to 1970, with the proportion of Mexicans 
apprehended rising from 50% in 1965 to 80% in 1970.146  By 1976, there was a 300,000-
visa backlog for Mexico alone; equaling approximately a 2 ½ year wait for qualified visa 
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applicants.147  On the border, apprehension numbers continued to rise in the 1970s, 
peaking at 460,000 alien immigrants apprehended per one thousand Border Patrol agents 
in 1977.148  Ultimately, the elimination of the Bracero program and the passage of quota 
laws limiting previously unlimited Mexican labor migration to the United States 
criminalized established patterns of behavior without providing a legislative solution for 
the legal usage of Mexican labor in the United States  
C. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR: LONG-TERM IMPACTS ON POLICY 
IMPLEMENTATION   
While it appears that the acceptance of the securitization/de-securitization 
dynamic of Mexican labor by relevant actors from 1917 to 1964 created long-term 
consequences for the continued consumption of Mexican labor in the United States, 
organizational behavior by the agencies tasked with implementing border security and 
immigration control significantly contributed to the long-term problem. First, due to the 
local nature of early recruits, lack of resources, and an unclear mission, organizational 
behavior of the USBP in the 1920s contributed to the creation of persistent seasonal work 
cycles of Mexican agricultural labor in the United States. Second, in a attempt “end” the 
problem of illegal immigration in 1954, INS Commissioner Joseph Swing implemented 
tactics that made the illegal immigration problem “disappear,” while actually creating 
policies that encouraged long-term labor cycles.    
Although the creation of the Border Patrol in 1924 ended the days of casual 
border crossings by Mexican nationals, the Border Patrol of the 1920s was too small and 
ineffective to present a major deterrent to border crossings. The small size of the Border 
Patrol and the local nature of many of the Border Patrol’s recruits, especially in Texas, 
led to the “flexible” enforcement of the use of illegal Mexican labor, creating 
employment patterns that were extremely difficult to break. In much of the Lower Rio 
Grande Valley from the 1920s into the 1940s, the Border Patrol largely served to prevent 
the movement of illegal Mexican labor from the area, thus ensuring that local farmers had 
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access to cheap labor without worries about wage competition from outside markets.149  
Not until 1944, when the Border Patrol received additional resources, a new generation of 
recruits from outside of the borderlands, and increased pressure from the United States 
government, did the USBP begin to crack down on the use of illegal Mexican farm labor 
in Texas.150  Once again, opposition from farmers forced the USBP to make 
organizational accommodations that further strengthened the long-term usage of Mexican 
labor in the southwest.    
By 1944, the old days of “flexible” border enforcement came to an end, changing 
a once-complimentary relationship between farmers and the Border Patrol into a 
relationship based on confrontation. Without the accommodating policies of the early 
border patrol, Texas farmers began to actively resist the Border Patrol by planting booby-
traps, creating early warning systems to spot USBP raids, and by vigorously filing 
complaints with local judges and politicians. New Border Patrol tactics, which focused on 
coordinated raids on farmers’ fields, resulted in large increases in apprehension rates of 
Mexican nationals. In 1953, the Border Patrol apprehended 839,149 illegal immigrants, 
and 96 percent of forced removals from the United States were Mexican nationals.151    
Facing increased pressure from the U.S. government to find a “solution” to the problem 
of illegal immigration on the southern border and also needing to end the resistance of 
farmers to the enforcement of immigration laws, the organizational response of the INS 
to these issues contributed to the development of long-term Mexican labor networks in 
the United States.152   
Post-1954 Operation Wetback, apprehension rates of illegal liens along the 
southwest border dropped dramatically. As previously discussed, part of this drop was 
due to a shift in INS/USBP tactics, but another reason for the drop in apprehensions was 
a new program started by the INS to facilitate the use of Braceros by Texas farmers. 
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Prior to 1954, farmers in Texas had mostly refused to participate in the Bracero program, 
relying instead on cheap and plentiful illegal Mexican labor. After years of increasing 
resistance to USBP enforcement efforts, Commissioner Swing implemented the I-100 
program to make the Bracero program more appealing to Texas farmers by granting them 
increased control over recruitment. The I-100 program provided braceros that had 
successfully completed a contract in the U.S. with an identification card that allowed 
them to enter into new bracero contracts without returning to recruitment centers in the 
U.S. In addition, in 1954 the INS declared that workers with I-100 cards would be given 
preference for bracero contracts over workers without the cards. By allowing direct 
recruitment through the I-100 program and by removing the necessity for Mexican 
workers to return to Mexico after every contract, the program increased incentives for 
farmers to utilize legal bracero labor by reducing transportation costs, increasing control 
over workers through direct recruiting, and also reduced the incentive for Mexicans to 
avoid the difficult recruiting process. Motivated by the massed raids of Operation 
Wetback and the positive features of the I-100 program, bracero contracts in Texas 
increased from 168 in July 1953 to 41,766 in 1954.153  
D. CONCLUSION 
From 1917 to 1964, the securitization of Mexican labor by relevant actors in the 
United States had long-term consequences for the borderlands. By arguing for the use of 
Mexican labor in the United States as a national security necessity, U.S. policy makers 
were able to implement extraordinary policies that would have been significantly more 
difficult to justify outside of a security context. Similarly, functional actors were able to 
take the extraordinary action of deporting Mexican nations from the United States during 
the Great Depression by securitizing Mexican labor as a threat to the economy and 
society of the United States. In both cases, not all relevant actors in the United States 
were convinced by the securitizing arguments, yet the extraordinary policies were 
implemented over the objections of some members of society. Therefore, it seems that to 
be deemed successful, securitizing acts need only convince actors with the power to 
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actual implement policy of the need to take extraordinary action instead of convincing 
society as a whole.   
Even when securitizing actors convince the audience of the necessity of 
extraordinary actions, the organizational behavior of the agencies tasked with 
implementing those actions has long-term consequences. Lack of funding, training, and 
supervision allowed Border Patrol agents to develop “flexible” enforcement procedures 
that accommodated the increased use of illegal Mexican labor, especially in Texas. In 
1954, facing pressure to remove estimated 1 million illegal aliens in the United States; 
INS Commissioner Joseph Swing implemented Operation Wetback. Commissioner 
Swing reported the operation to be a success, even though he purposefully changed 
INS/USBP enforcement tactics to ensure that the apprehension numbers of illegal aliens 
dropped after the conclusion of the operation. By bowing to organizational incentives to 
create a public policy “success,” Commissioner Swing helped to ensure the development 
of persistent labor immigration without helping the U.S. government to form policy to 
effectively and honestly deal with the long-term consumption of Mexican labor. As 
always, short-term solutions, both in the securitization of Mexican labor and the 
enforcement of security policy for the borderlands, have very long term implications. 
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